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GENERAL PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS AS SECURITIES
IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
I. INTRODUCTION
The definition of a security has puzzled courts since the inception of
the federal securities laws. The term explicitly encompasses common
investments including stocks, bonds and notes. The provisions, how-
ever, cover more than these ordinary types of investments. Section 2(1)
of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act)I and Section 3(a)(10) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act)2 include an "invest-
ment contract" 3 in the definition of "security."
The securities laws do not define the term "investment contract,"
and courts have liberally construed the term as a catch-all for any type of
investment that arguably could be deemed a security. 4 In 1946, the
Supreme Court filled this definitional void in S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co. 5
In Howey, the Court stated "[tihe test is whether the scheme involves an
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely
from the efforts of others." 6 Justification for broad interpretation ema-
nated from state "blue sky" legislation 7 and the remedial nature of the
federal securities laws.
8
The Tenth Circuit recently addressed the enigmatic definition of
investment contract in Banghart v. Hollywood General Partnership.9 The
court expressly considered whether a general partnership interest con-
1. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988).
3. The 1933 Act provides:
When used in this title unless the context otherwise requires-
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-shar-
ing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscrip-
tion, transferable share, investment contract ....
15 U.S.C § 77b(l) (1988).
The 1934 Act provides:
When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any
oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preor-
ganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract ....
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988).
4. See generally Note, Catch-All Investment Contracts: The Economic Realities Otherwise Re-
quire, 14 CUMB. L. REV. 135 (1983-84).
5. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
6. Id. at 301.
7. Id. at 298. In Howey the Court articulated that a broad interpretation of the term
"investment contract" was warranted due to the term's common use in state blue sky laws
and the broad interpretation of the term by state courts.
8. Id. at 298-99. See also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 & n.19 (1967).
"Even a casual reading of § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act reveals that Congress did not intend
to adopt a narrow or restrictive concept of security in defining that term."
9. 902 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1990).
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stituted a security. The Tenth Circuit's application of the "solely from
the efforts of others" wording from the Howey test to general partner-
ship interests is the topic of this Article.
II. BACKGROUND
A. S.E.C. v. WJ. Howey Co.
The Supreme Court defined an investment contract in the seminal
case of S.E.C. v. WJ. Howey Co. 10 The W.J. Howey Company ("Howey")
owned large tracts of citrus acreage in Florida. Over several years,
Howey planted about 500 acres annually and offered roughly half of this
acreage to the public "to help . . . finance additional development.""
In addition to selling the parcel of land, Howey also offered each pro-
spective customer a service contract with Howey-in-the-Hills Service,
Inc. ("Hills"). Hills cultivated and developed the parcels of land.
The issue confronted by the Court involved determining whether a
land sales contract, coupled with a conveyance of land and a service con-
tract, constituted a security.' 2 Specifically, the Court addressed whether
the arrangement amounted to an investment contract. In defining the
phrase "investment contract," the Court noted that the securities laws
had to be broadly construed in order to effectuate the legislative policy
for protecting investors.' 3 The Court easily found that the purchases
had a number of attributes of an investment contract, including the in-
vestment of money with the expectation of profits.
The most difficult analysis arose under the element which required
that profits come solely from the efforts of others. The Court found that
because most investors were out-of-state residents unable to participate
in management, and the size of the parcels of land were individually
insignificant, the investors relied on the efforts of Howey and Hills to
produce profits from the common enterprise.'
4
B. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman
Since the Supreme Court had interpreted the term "solely" within
the context of the specific facts of Howey, lower courts were given little
guidance for interpreting the term generally. After Howey, lower courts
generally rejected a literalist interpretation of the word "solely" in favor
of a functionalist definition. In S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
Inc.,'5 the Ninth Circuit stated "the term 'solely' should not be read as a
strict or literal limitation on the definition of an investment contract, but
10. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
11. Id. at 295.
12. Id. at 297.
13. Id. at 299. "[The concept of security] embodies a flexible rather than a static prin-
ciple, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised
by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits."
14. Id. at 300. "Thus all the elements of a profit-seeking business venture are present
here. The investors provide the capital and share in the earnings and profits; the promot-
ers manage, control and operate the enterprise."
15. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
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rather must be construed realistically, so as to include within the defini-
tion those schemes which involve in substance, if not form, securities."16
Other courts generally followed suit.
The Supreme Court explicitly accepted the prevailing definition of
"solely" in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman.17 United Housing in-
volved the issue of "whether shares of stock entitling a purchaser to
lease an apartment in Co-op City, a state subsidized and supervised non-
profit housing cooperative, are 'securities' within the purview of the [se-
curities laws]."' 18 The Court found the investment not to be a security
because the purchasers bought the investment in order to obtain low
cost housing and not to make a profit.
In deciding the case, the Court redefined the Howey test. Rather
than relying upon the names given the investment by the parties, the
economic realities of the transaction governed whether a security ex-
isted.' 9 The Court also reformulated the Howey test by stating: "The
touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture pre-
mised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the en-
trepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." 2 % The reformulation
effectively changed the Howey test in three ways. First, the expectation
of profits needed to be reasonable. Second, the economic realities re-
quirement allowed a court the discretion to avoid the Howey test alto-
gether if the economic realities of a given situation dictated the absence
of a security. 2 1 The third and most important change resulted from the
Court's implicit adoption of the broader interpretation of the term
"solely" created by the lower courts. 2 2
III. WILLIAMSON V. TUCKER
Under the Howey-United Housing test, while limited partnership inter-
ests usually constituted investment contracts, general partnership inter-
ests did not. The distinction resulted from the significant amount of
control retained by the general partners. 2 3 This changed six years after
United Housing when the Fifth Circuit decided Williamson v. Tucker.24 In
Williamson, M.L. Goodwin Investments, Inc. ("Goodwin") executed con-
16. Id. at 482. Contra S.E.C. v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga.
1973), rev'd, 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974) (The district court adopted a literalist view of
"solely" which was overruled by the Fifth Circuit's adoption of the more prevalent func-
tional definition).
17. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
18. Id. at 840.
19. Id. at 851-52. "In considering these claims we ... must examine the substance-
the economic realities of the transaction-rather than the names that may have been em-
ployed by the parties."
20. Id. at 852.
21. Note, Catch-All Investment Contracts: The Economic Realities Otherwise Require, 14 CUMB.
L. REV. 135 (1983-84).
22. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 n.16 (1975). The Court
cited with approval the definition provided by the Ninth Circuit in S.E.C. v. Glenn W.
Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
23. McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781, 785 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
24. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
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tracts to purchase joint venture interests in development of a large tract
of land around the then proposed Dallas-Fort Worth Airport. Goodwin
represented to potential investors that he would pursue development or
sale of the property, perform all management functions and endeavor to
rezone the land from single-family to another, more beneficial category.
Despite the representations of Goodwin, the investors retained con-
siderable control over the investment. The investors' unanimous con-
sent was required to confess a judgment, make guarantees, execute
deeds of trust, borrow money in the name of the joint venture or use
joint venture property as collateral. In order to develop the property, a
vote of at least sixty percent was mandated. Any dissenter who voted
against the development could compel the remaining venturers to
purchase the dissenter's interest.
Although the Fifth Circuit remanded on other grounds, the court,
in dicta, applied the Howey test to determine whether these joint venture
interests were securities. The court easily found the first two elements
present. The problem arose over whether the income from interests
purchased was derived from the managerial efforts of others. The court
enunciated factors relevant to whether the venturers retained meaning-
ful partnership powers, stating:
[A] general partnership interest or joint venture interest can be
designated a security if the investor can establish, for example,
that (1) an agreement among the parties leaves so little power
in the hands of the partner or venturer that the arrangement in
fact distributes power as would a limited partnership; or (2) the
partner or venturer is so inexperienced and unknowledgeable
in business affairs that he is incapable of intelligently exercising
his partnership or venture powers; or (3) the partner or ven-
turer is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or man-
agerial ability of the promoter or manager that he cannot
replace the manager of the enterprise or otherwise exercise
meaningful partnership or venture powers. 25
The first standard related specifically to the partnership agreement.
If the agreement gave significant power to all general partners, the inter-
est was not a security. Moreover, the court would only have to look to
the powers created in the agreement and not the powers actually
exercised.
The second and third factors required the court to go beneath the
underlying contract and look subjectively at the investor and the pro-
moter or manager. By analyzing each party to a transaction, the court
created the possibility of anomalous results.2 6 For example, identical
general partnerships would be regarded differently under the securities
laws if the investors in the first venture consisted of real estate develop-
ers while the second venture consisted of persons with little or no mana-
25. Id. at 424.
26. Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720, 729 (9th Cir. 1988). The court recognized the
possibility of varying results as to different investors in the same venture.
(Vol. 68:4




After Williamson, a debate arose among the federal circuits concern-
ing the possibility that a general partnership interest could constitute a
security.2 8 The Fourth and Ninth Circuits expressly refused to adopt all
of the enumerated standards, using only the first Williamson standard re-
quiring judicial inquiry into the contractual rights of the parties and
nothing more.
In Matek v. Murat,29 Murat decided to purchase an old Navy vessel
in order to convert it into a fish processing plant. Murat formed a gen-
eral partnership to finance the venture. Twelve people invested
$100,000 each to start-up the business. In deciding whether a general
partnership interest in the venture constituted a security, the Ninth Cir-
cuit looked to the partnership agreement and held that Matek retained
sufficient control over partnership affairs to exclude the investment from
being construed as an investment contract. In reaching this decision,
the court expressly declined to use the second and third prongs of the
Williamson 30 test, stating that use of these additional prongs would "cre-
ate uncertainty in the area of business investing." 3' Once its analysis
was limited to the agreement between the parties, the court concluded
that the general partnership interest gave sufficient control over part-
nership management to Matek. The interest was not, therefore, an in-
vestment contract.
The Fourth Circuit also specifically addressed the use of the second
and third prongs of the Williamson test in Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v.
Thompson Trawlers.32 Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited ("RTU") was formed
when twenty-three parties executed a general partnership agreement in
order to engage in a commercial fishing business. After approximately
one year of operations at below profit expectations, the partners twice
replaced management and removed the original managing partner. Af-
ter two years of operations, certain partners filed a complaint alleging
their interests to be securities and arguing that Thompson Trawlers vio-
lated the federal securities laws. In resolving the controversy, the court
agreed with the approach articulated in Williamson but declined to look
27. Morgenstern, Real Estate Joint Venture Interests as Securities: The Implications of William-
son v. Tucker, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 1231, 1246 (1982).
28. Some courts explicitly or implicitly adopted the Williamson approach in its entirety.
See Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1986); Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212 (6th
Cir. 1983); Pfohl v. Pelican Landing, 567 F. Supp 134 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Fund of Funds, Ltd.
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F. Supp. 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Other courts have adopted
only the first Williamson standard. See Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers,
840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988); Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1988). One court has
expressly declined to follow Williamson. See Goodwin v. Elkins & Co. 730 F.2d 99 (3rd Cir.
1984).
29. 862 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1988).
30. Id. at 729. "Except for the first element ... we decline to follow the Williamson
test."
31. Id.
32. 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988).
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into the actual knowledge and business expertise of any individual part-
ner in order to determine that partner's ability to exercise powers.
33
The court held the interests were not securities due to the broad author-
ity conferred on the partners under the original agreement.
The Third Circuit, in Goodwin v. Elkins & Co.,34 decided to reject
Williamson and chose, instead, to allow partnership and contract law to
settle disputes concerning general partnership interests. The court held
that "a participant who holds a general partnership interest in an enter-
prise, at least as that interest is defined under Pennsylvania law, does not
possess a security within the meaning of the federal securities laws."
3 5
The court placed critical reliance on the powers possessed by general
partners under state law. Specifically, the court found relevant a non-
managing partner's ability to act as an agent and to bind the firm in the
same manner as managing partners. The rights granted under state law
were sufficient to withdraw non-managing partnerships from the scope
of the federal securities laws.
V. TENTH CIRCurr TREATMENT
A. The Road to Banghart" Maritan v. Birmingham Properties
After Williamson, the Tenth Circuit did not face the same issue
presented to the Fifth Circuit until Banghart.3 6 In the interim, the court
confronted a residual issue. In Maritan v. Birmingham Properties,3 7 the
Tenth Circuit addressed whether a limited partnership interest was a
security subject to the federal securities laws. It determined that the
proper inquiry was limited to the actual agreement originally signed. 38
After performing the examination, the court appropriately determined
that the contract provided adequate basis for protection of Maritan's in-
vestment, thereby removing the limited partnership interest from the
reach of the securities laws. Although inquiry primarily focused on the
agreement, the amount of control actually exercised by Maritan remained
important. The actual control exercised by Maritan was not deemed
conclusive as to what kind of interest was acquired. Instead, the agree-
ment or contract was first analyzed and any exercise of managerial con-
trol by the parties would be viewed as "shed[ding] light on how the
parties regarded Maritan's rights and status under the agreement all
along."
3 9
B. Banghart v. Hollywood General Partnership
Maritan set the stage for resolution of the general partnership issue.
Although Maritan held that limited partnership interests might not be
33. Id. at 241 n.7.
34. 730 F.2d 99 (3rd. Cir. 1984).
35. Id. at 108 (footnote omitted).
36. Banghart v. Hollywood General Partnership, 902 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1990).
37. 875 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1989).
38. Id. at 1458.
39. Id. at 1459.
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securities when the partnership agreement allocated sufficient manage-
rial control, the converse issue of whether a general partnership interest
could be a security had not been confronted.
The Tenth Circuit addressed this issue in Banghart v. Hollywood Gen-
eral Partnership.4 0 In Banghart, Dallas and Michael Banghart sued the
Hollywood General Partnership, alleging various misrepresentations
which induced them into entering an "Exchange Agreement" 4 1 to
purchase a general partnership interest.4 2 Because a partnership inter-
est usually allowed the general partner to participate in the business and
inspect documents, the plaintiff seemed to lack the necessary passivity
for the instrument to be deemed an investment contract.4 3 Instead, re-
lying on the analysis in Williamson, Banghart argued that "a lack of any
discernible role for some general partners within the Hollywood Gen-
eral Partnership raise[d] a triable issue of whether the partnership inter-
est contemplated in the 'Exchange Agreement' was a security."
4 4
The Tenth Circuit, however, decided against Banghart and upheld
the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the Partnership. The
court deemed the core issue to be whether the interest plaintiffs sought
to acquire pursuant to the agreement constituted an investment con-
tract. 45 The court examined the agreement under the three part Howey
test, as modified by United Housing.
46
The first and second parts of the Howey test were not at issue in
Banghart.4 7 Instead, the argument centered on the third element of the
40. 902 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1990).
41. The "Exchange Agreement" contained in relevant part the following:
This Agreement . . . [bletween Hollywood General Partnership, hereinafter re-
ferred to as HOLLYWOOD, who are owners of the building located at 5601
Hollywood NE, and between Dallas Banghart, hereinafter referred to as BANG-
HART, owner of two tri-plexes located at 523 and 527 Texas NE, is for the ex-
change of the two tri-plexes for a 30% interest in the building of Hollywood NE
under the following terms and conditions:
1. Hollywood agrees to the exchange of the tri-plexes at a net equity value
to Banghart of $3 1,000.00 Total and to assume the mortgages on the two tri-
plexes, subject to verification of mortgage amounts.
2. For the Above $31,000 equity, Hollywood agrees to grant to Banghart a
30% interest in the Hollywood Property. To accomplish this, the Hollywood
General Partnership Agreement will be amended or re-done to show the ad-
ditional interest by Banghart ....
42. Banghart, 902 F.2d at 806. The court stated that "[a]ccording to plaintiffs, they
were induced into entering this agreement by the representations of defendants and, had
the agreement been consummated, they would have acquired a general partnership inter-
est in the Hollywood General Partnership."
43. If Banghart had claimed he would have received a general partnership interest
with full managerial rights, this claim would have been dispositive in the case in light of
Maritan v. Birmingham Properties, 875 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1989).
44. Banghart, 902 F.2d at 807.
45. Id. at 806.
46. Id. at 807. The court did not state the proposition explicitly but adopted the
wording of the Howy test as expressed in Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 570
F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1978). In Crowley, the court stated "[w]e are bound by the Howey test
as reaffirmed in United Housing. The requirements are (1) an investment, (2) in a com-
mon enterprise, (3) with 'a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the en-
trepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.' " Id. at 880.
47. Generally, there will not be a dispute regarding the first two elements of the test
since there is almost always an investment of money (or something of value) and a com-
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Howey-Forman test.48 The court stated, "[a]n investment satisfies this
third prong when the efforts made by those other than the investor are
the ones which affect significantly the success or failure of the enter-
prise." 49 The court first considered the Fifth Circuit approach created
in Williamson and, subsequently, restated the three exceptions to the rule
that general partnership interests cannot constitute securities.
50
After reviewing the test, the court implicitly rejected the William-
son 5 ' approach by relying on Maritan.52 Moreover, it directly relied on
the Fourth and Ninth Circuit's approaches in Rivanna
5 3 and Matek.5 4
Judicial inquiry, therefore, became restricted to the terms of the partner-
ship agreement. The Tenth Circuit looked strictly at the "Exchange
Agreement" 55 in order to determine what type of interest Banghart had
acquired. Since the agreement spoke of Banghart obtaining a general
partnership interest, the court focused on the general partnership agree-
ment to determine the level of participation it contractually granted to
Banghart. Because Banghart presented no evidence with respect to the
general partnership agreement at trial, there was nothing in the record
to guide the court in deciding the participation granted to Banghart.
This evidentiary void proved fatal to Banghart's case.
The Banghart decision created some interesting consequences, the
most important of which concerned the contractual rights of the inves-
tor to obtain information from the partnership. 56 The court ostensibly
recognized that without this protection, an investor actually has no rea-
sonable mechanism to become informed of the current status of the in-
mon purpose of the partnership. The main focus will be on interpreting the part of the
third element relating to the "reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the en-
trepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." Banghart, 902 F.2d at 807 (emphasis added). In-
herent in a general partnership interest is the ability to manage the business. Without this
control, the interest becomes more analogous to a limited partnership interest. See Power
Petroleums, Inc. v. P & G Mining Co., 682 F. Supp. 492, 493 (D. Colo. 1988) ("Generally,
partnership interests are not securities. Defendants admit, however, that the key in deter-
mining whether a general partnership interest is a security is whether the partner has the
power to exercise partnership functions.")(citation omitted).
48. This prong of the test requires that the investment be made "with a reasonable
expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others." Banghart, 902 F.2d at 807.
49. Banghart, 902 F.2d at 807. See also Meyer v. Dans unJardin, S.A., 816 F.2d 533,
535 (10th Cir. 1987) ("In many situations, however, a strict interpretation of the word
'solely' would run counter to the broad remedial purposes of the securities acts and defeat
the Court's intent to follow 'a flexible rather than a static principle.' Accordingly, we have
adopted the view that the reliance element is met when 'the efforts made by those other
than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.' ")(citations omitted).
50. Banghart, 902 F.2d at 807-08.
51. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
52. Maritan v. Birmingham Properties, 875 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1989).
53. Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988).
54. Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1988).
55. See supra note 41.
56. See Matek, 862 F.2d at 728. The Ninth Circuit properly stated that "[tihe principal
purpose of the securities acts is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of infor-
mation necessary to informed investment decisions. Therefore, access to information
about the investment, and not managerial control, is the most significant factor." (citations
omitted).
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vestment, aside from active participation in management.
Consequently, a lack of protection under state partnership law may enti-
tle an investor to protection under the federal securities laws.
C. Consequences
By requiring disclosure to the investor, the court diminished the
necessity for the second and third Williamson factors related to the sub-
jective knowledge, business intelligence, and abilities of the investors.
Because full appraisal of partnership endeavors is now required, the
burden should naturally shift to the investor to make his own decision as
to the quality of the investment. Once a partner has received disclosure
and the ability to maintain it, contract and partnership law should deter-
mine the rights of the partners.
Another important consideration concerns the managerial control
allocated to the investor under the partnership agreement. Where suffi-
cient control over the affairs of the partnership is not granted, the possi-
bility that the sale of the partnership interest will be considered a
security arises. The Fourth Circuit has aptly stated:
When, however, a partnership agreement allocates powers to
the general partners that are specific and unambiguous, and
when those powers are sufficient to allow the general partners
to exercise ultimate control, as a majority, over the partnership
and its business, then the presumption that the general part-
nership is not a security can only be rebutted by evidence that it
is not possible for the partners to exercise those powers.
5 7
Two important consequences result. First, the court will only look
to the partnership agreement to determine the actual amount of control
allocated to the partners. If no control is present, then the investment
looks like a security. Second, a substantial burden is placed on a plaintiff
to rebut the presumption that the securities laws do not apply to a part-
nership interest that has been allowed contractually to participate in
management. Mere non-participation by the investor is insufficient to
rebut this presumption. The plaintiff must show that he was affirma-
tively obstructed from participation in management.
By looking to the contractual ability to participate in management,
the court negated the need for the third Williamson factor. 58 Since the
investor is able to participate in management through the contract, he is
not totally dependent on the "unique entrepreneurial or managerial
ability of the promoter or manager . ."59 Even though the investor
might be relying on another's efforts, he is still able to exercise sufficient
managerial control under the agreement. Whether that particular inves-
tor desires to participate is of no consequence since the ability is actually
present.
57. Rivanna, 840 F.2d at 241.
58. See supra note 41 for the Exchange Agreement at issue in Banghart.
59. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, at 424 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897
(1981).
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Finally, Banghart stabilized this area of law. By requiring courts to
look only to the partnership agreement, the Tenth Circuit opted for a
bright line rule and thereby created certainty. Although under certain
circumstances an occasional injustice might result, the security estab-
lished by the Tenth Circuit's approach outweighs the possible negative
effects. Promoters and others offering general partnership interests as
investments will not risk being subjected to federal securities laws so
long as the partners retain real and substantial rights under the partner-
ship agreement.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit correctly decided Banghart by looking to the con-
tract to determine whether the third part of the Howey test had been
satisfied. The court adopted the best approach because it only allows
judicial inquiry into the contract to determine the parties' intentions. By
looking at the contract, the court created certainty in an area which had
previously been overreaching in its scope. Now, promoters selling part-
nership interests will know that in order to avoid application of the se-
curities laws, they must continually disclose all relevant information and
grant some amount of meaningful managerial control to the investor. If
this is done, there will be little room for a plaintiff to argue that the
securities laws apply, because the plaintiff must show that the promoter
or other partners affirmatively kept that investor/partner from participa-
tion in partnership affairs.
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